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Abstract
In recent years, a range of new indices, benchmarking and scorecard tools—also 
known as ‘indicators’—have been developed to influence public policy and to pro-
mote accountability. While subjected to important technical and political critiques, 
the policy impact of ‘indicators’ is often assumed yet rarely demonstrated. Suitable 
evaluative methods are in their infancy. This article adopts an innovative process 
tracing analysis to assess the policy impact of the Hunger And Nutrition Commit-
ment Index (HANCI) in Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, Zambia and globally. We pre-
sent a rare and empirically rich application of this systematic qualitative evaluative 
method. We further contribute to the theorisation of ‘indicators’ by positing a central 
role for equitable producer–user relations in mediating policy impact, and demon-
strate that such relations can overcome significant political critiques on ‘indicators’.
Keywords Impact evaluation · Indicators · Policy · Food and nutrition security · 
Process tracing · Indices · Metrics
Résumé
Ces dernières années, toute une gamme de nouveaux outils - index, analyses com-
paratives et tableaux de bord, également appelés « indicateurs » - a été mise au point 
pour influencer les politiques publiques et promouvoir la redevabilité. Bien que 
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soumis à d’importantes critiques tant techniques que politiques, l’impact des « indi-
cateurs » sur la politique est souvent supposé, mais rarement démontré. Les méthodes 
d’évaluation adaptées en sont à leurs balbutiements. Cet article utilise une analyse 
innovante de traçage des processus pour évaluer l’impact sur la politique publique de 
l’indice d’engagement contre la faim et pour la nutrition (HANCI) au Bangladesh, 
au Malawi, au Népal, en Zambie et dans le monde. Nous présentons une application 
à la fois rare et riche sur le plan empirique, de cette méthode d’évaluation qualitative 
systématique. Nous contribuons également à la théorisation des “indicateurs” en rev-
endiquant le rôle central de relations équitables entre producteurs et utilisateurs dans 
la médiation de l’impact des politiques, et nous démontrons que de telles relations 
peuvent surmonter d’importantes critiques politiques sur les “indicateurs”.
Introduction
In recent years, reducing hunger and malnutrition has come to be viewed as much 
an outcome of a political process as of technical interventions. Political commit-
ment is now seen as essential for bringing food and nutrition security higher up on 
public policy agendas (FAO et al. 2014; Foresight 2011; Gillespie et al. 2013). As a 
consequence, a range of new metrics, analytics and scorecard tools have proliferated 
to assess political commitment and to promote accountability for reducing hunger 
and malnutrition. These include: the Global Hunger Index (WHH et al., 2012), the 
Access to Nutrition Index (GAIN 2013) or The Economist’s Global Food Security 
Index (EIU 2012), World Health Organization (WHO) Nutrition Landscape Analy-
ses (Engesveen et al. 2009) and the Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (te 
Lintelo et al. 2013), amongst others.
These instruments mark part of a global trend, with Davis et al. (2012, pp. 73–74) 
defining an indicator1 as “a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to 
represent the past or projected performance of different units” […] “used to com-
pare particular units of analysis (such as countries, institutions, or corporations), 
synchronically or over time, and to evaluate their performance by reference to one 
or more standards.” Typically, ‘indicators’ aim to support accountability, monitor, 
evaluate, influence and reform public policy reform and to affect attitudes, behav-
iours and actions of governments and their bureaucratic apparatus.
Academic literatures on ‘indicators’ are located in two distinct analytical tradi-
tions. First, a ‘design’ approach focusses on scrutinising the technical robustness of 
‘indicators’ (e.g. Decancq and Lugo 2010; Høyland et al. 2012; Masset 2011; Raval-
lion 2011). Second, a ‘political’ approach critically interrogates their power, govern-
ance and knowledge effects (Davis 2014; Davis et al. 2012; Hansen and Muehlen-
Schulte 2012; Merry 2011; Muehlen-Schulte 2012).
1 Indices, scorecards and other metrics are sometimes referred to as ‘benchmarks’ (Larner and Le Heron 
2004) or ‘external assessments’ (Parks et al. 2015). To distinguish instruments from the usual terminol-
ogy of indicator as a variable, here we will use ‘indicators’ (in quotation marks) to refer to the former.
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Both ‘design’ and ‘political’ traditions typically treat ‘indicators’ as a depend-
ent variable (that requires explanation), yet their policy impact is often assumed but 
rarely demonstrated. Hence, there is now a distinct empirical and theoretical need 
to instead consider ‘indicators’ “as explanatory variables and look for their impact 
on specific policy innovations” (Kelley and Simmons 2015, p. 68). Such a call also 
aligns with growing demands from policymakers, including international aid donors, 
for practitioners and researchers involved in producing ‘indicators’ to demonstrate 
impact, for instance in the shape of policy influence. This, in turn, raises methodo-
logical questions about the ways in which we can ascertain causality in case studies 
of ‘indicators’ and their external validity (Stern et al. 2013) while taking account of 
interactions between ‘indicators’ as intervention and their dynamic contexts (Byrne 
2013).
Accordingly, this article makes two main contributions to debates about the 
policy impact of ‘indicators’. The first contribution is methodological. Although 
‘indicators’ are frequently used in policy advocacy, evaluating their policy impact 
is often complicated. Quantitative impact evaluation methods are ill suited to the 
task, as these require, for instance, counterfactuals and control over implementa-
tion. While newly emergent qualitative systematic evaluation tools have promise, 
they have not been tested widely as yet (Naeve et  al. 2017), and their application 
to ‘indicators’ is extremely rare. Accordingly, we draw on case study evaluation lit-
eratures and offer a process tracing (PT) analysis to interrogate the policy impact of 
‘indicators’. We present a detailed case study of the Hunger And Nutrition Commit-
ment Index (HANCI). First issued in 2013, this index systematically compares and 
ranks 45 high-burden countries along a set of 22 policy, legal and financial variables 
that express government political commitment to address hunger and undernutrition 
(www.hanci ndex.org). In particular, we present evidence on the use of HANCI in 
Bangladesh, Nepal, Malawi, Zambia and in the global sphere.
Secondly, this paper adds to the theorisation of pathways through which ‘indi-
cator’ impact can be achieved. In particular, we challenge the dominant theoretical 
model and empirical practice that poses a dichotomy between ‘indicator’ producers 
and users, and emphasises the technical rigour and communicative appropriateness 
of ‘indicators’. Rather, we assert that equitable producer–user partnerships can not 
only be catalytic in achieving impact, but also successfully confront important cri-
tiques on ‘indicators’.
Following this introduction, in the next section we review an emerging global lit-
erature on ‘indicators’. We then present the study methodology, results and a discus-
sion, followed by a brief conclusion.
Theory
‘Indicators’ involve the selection, compilation, simplification, aggregation, filter-
ing and naming of the resulting numeric product and are used to evaluate the 
performance of states, private-sector actors or international bodies (Davis et  al. 
2012). While differing in aims, composition, sectoral and country coverage, 
‘indicators’ typically comment on policies (e.g. governments having nutrition 
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policies), social practices (e.g. the rates of adoption of best practices for infant 
and young child feeding) and private-sector or government qualities (e.g. political 
commitment) (Kelley and Simmons 2015).
The theorisation of ‘indicators’ is broadly located within a Foucauldian 
approach to analysing power. Focussing on the ‘conduct of conduct’, such anal-
yses interrogate the governmental and social technologies and forms of knowl-
edge that monitor and steer people’s behaviour, thinking and moral practice, often 
from a distance (Dean 2010). Within the realm of food governance, such analyses 
have been fruitfully applied to a very diverse set of issues: from the disciplining 
effects of diets (Ristovski-Slijepcevic et  al. 2010), to the management of refu-
gee pig farms (Wing Chan and Miller 2015), and the transformation of rural life 
through the moral economic force of agricultural grades and standards (Busch 
2000).
There is now broad agreement that ‘indicators’ are valuable to policymakers, pri-
vate-sector actors, researchers and civil society groups (Davis et al. 2012; Høyland 
et al. 2012; Merry 2011). They are often used to draw attention to social problems, 
to analyse causes or consequences of policy interventions, to promote social justice 
and policy reform strategies (Davis et al. 2012; Larner and Le Heron 2004; Parks 
et al. 2015; Ravallion 2011) and to hold political leaders accountable to international 
standards (Kelley and Simmons 2015; Rosga and Satterthwaite 2009). Civil society 
groups increasingly use ‘indicators’, as funders demand them to demonstrate quan-
tifiable evidence of their activities’ impact (Merry 2011). The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank use the Bank’s World 
Governance ‘indicators’ and the Ease of Doing Business ‘indicators’ to decide on 
foreign aid allocations (Davis et al. 2012). And in the private sector, ‘indicators’ are 
used to advise investors on political risks, for corporate social responsibility reviews 
and for selection of locations for foreign direct investment (Davis 2014).
Evidence is growing that ‘indicators’ can influence government policy, as shown 
in studies of e.g. the Ease of Doing Business Index (Davis 2014; Schueth 2011), the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Galtung 2006) and the US State Department’s Traf-
ficking in Persons Report (Davis et al. 2012; Kelley and Simmons 2015). Surveys 
with decision-makers in developing countries also affirm indicator influence (Parks 
et al. 2015). Otherwise, evidence of their influence can be found in their contestation 
(Hansen and Muehlen-Schulte 2012, p. 458). Ratings are cited, discussed and some-
times excoriated, indicating their power to draw attention and set the terms of policy 
debates (Kelley and Simmons 2015, p. 59). Policy actors are more sensitive to rank-
ings and numbers than to texts and words (Hansen and Muehlen-Schulte 2012, p. 
457), not least because popular and political debates tend to erroneously interpret 
rankings as highly accurate (Høyland et al. 2012).
The influence of ‘indicators’ is deemed greatest in framing and agenda-setting 
processes (Parks et  al. 2015). In the field of nutrition, civil society organisations 
(CSOs) are documented to have played a significant role in policy advocacy (Mejia 
Acosta and Haddad 2014; Pelletier et al. 2013). Their deep insight into the nuts and 
bolts, and the politics of local systems of government can help to connect marginal-
ised citizens to policy debates, and facilitate political entrepreneurship. Policy advo-
cates engage decision-making processes by offering targeted framings of a problem 
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and its solutions (Shiffman 2007), but the credibility of advocacy claims requires 
solid evidence too (Gillespie et al. 2013). ‘Indicators’ could provide such data.
Usually, global ‘indicators’ harbour an implicit theory of change that proposes 
that technically sound and effectively communicated ‘indicators’ somehow will 
affect policy stakeholders. Kelley and Simmons (2015) have made an important start 
opening this causal black box (Fig.  1). They argue that states, intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs) and private actors employ ‘indicators’ to inform domestic poli-
tics, encourage elite peer shaming and generate international pressure, to produce 
political, reputational or material consequences that drive state behaviour to repri-
oritise and change policy and reform law (Kelley and Simmons 2015).
Generally, policymakers’ responses depend on their subjective regard for the rat-
ing body. They seek to learn how to improve scores by consulting policy advice 
issued in reports. While decision-makers generally dislike low ratings, they also 
respond to and publicly take credit for improving country performance, with posi-
tive rankings stimulating efforts to maintain these (ibid). Moreover, policymakers 
like ‘indicators’ because decision-making processes that rely on these can be pre-
sented as efficient, consistent, legitimate, transparent, scientific and impartial (Davis 
2014; Davis et al. 2012, p. 84).
As the global popularity of ‘indicators’ has soared, a growing body of critique 
has emerged, using technical and political lenses. Technical appraisals consider the 
validity and reliability of ‘indicator’ design, question whether they help us to under-
stand the phenomena they seek to measure and ask if outcomes such as rankings are 
interpreted correctly (Davis 2014; Høyland et al. 2012). Others challenge the lack of 
transparency in ‘indicator’ construction and calculation (Decancq and Lugo 2010; 
Merry 2011; Ravallion 2011). This is important because the concepts that ‘indica-
tors’ seek to capture are often difficult to measure, whether it concerns rule of law, 
ease of doing business or political commitment.
A second set of critiques underlines ‘indicators’ constitute a political act, with 
knowledge and governance effects (Merry 2011). ‘Indicators’ exercise power 
through their ability “to name, to define and to describe certain people and places as 
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Fig. 1  Causal mechanisms: indicators and policy change. Source Kelley and Simmons 2015
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being different from others and in a way that excludes other definitions” (Larner and 
Le Heron 2004, p. 219). They generate a ‘politics by numbers’ by facilitating com-
parisons among units and over time and by establishing ‘standards’ against which 
comparisons are made (Davis et al. 2012, p. 77). Most ‘indicators’ routinely observe 
and check the progress or quality of a policy, practice or condition over a period of 
time, to encourage self-monitoring and self-regulation, underpinned by peer-sham-
ing mechanisms that pressurise those who are revealed to ‘underperform’ (Kelley 
and Simmons 2015; Merry 2011, p. S85). ‘Indicators’ hence are not simply a neu-
tral tool of measurement providing sources of knowledge about, but also a means 
of governing, actors, societies and states. They create new fields of competition and 
bring their own spaces and subjects into existence (Larner and Le Heron 2004, pp. 
215, 219).
Producers are often motivated by the ability of ‘indicators’ to attract attention to 
their causes (Büthe and Mattli 2011). Yet, ‘indicators’ “typically conceal their politi-
cal and theoretical origins and underlying theories of social change and activism” 
(Merry 2011, p. S84). One core plank of the political critique to ‘indicators’ hence 
concerns their ability to depoliticise. Intended to be easy to understand and ready to 
be consumed by policymakers, ‘indicators’ trade off usage with over-simplification 
of complex context-specific phenomena (Davis et  al. 2012; Larner and Le Heron 
2004, p. 214; Merry 2011). Furthermore, as relatively few people have the techni-
cal expertise and resources to understand how ‘indicator’ scores are determined, 
they concentrate power among technocrats, ‘expert’ producers, users and sponsoring 
organisations (Merry 2011; Davis et al. 2012). Finally, as ‘indicators’ are typically 
designed and labelled in the global north (Merry 2011), they offer limited informa-
tion about local conditions (Davis 2014).
Materials and Methods
Up until about two decades ago, political scientists and development economists 
largely relied on econometric models to establish causal claims (Voors 2018, p. 80). 
Much methodological innovation regarding the application of case studies in impact 
evaluation has occurred since (Stern et  al. 2013). The world is now commonly 
understood as composed of complex systems that mediate causal effects of interven-
tions in non-linear ways. Exploring the impact of ‘indicators’ thus requires under-
standing interactions between the intervention (e.g. HANCI), the context and the 
people involved in these (Byrne 2013; Yin 2013). Importantly, there are potentially 
multiple causal paths to the same outcome, where “each path is a specific conjunc-
tion of factors” (Mahoney and Goertz 2006, p. 237). By detecting configurations of 
causal factors in complex systems, case studies can support inductive social science 
theory building (Byrne 2013).
The process tracing (PT) method is designed to be applied in complex contexts 
where competing causal explanations may be found for observed outcomes (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013; Collier 2011). We employ a theory building PT approach within 
a single-case research design. Firstly, we postulate a causal mechanism for how 
HANCI may have achieved policy impact, and empirically test for its validity. We 
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analyse whether the theorised mechanism is present, and whether it functions as 
expected. Evidence presented covers the period from the inception of HANCI in 
April 2012 until November 2015.
We then build on this analysis to critically reflect on current critiques on ‘indi-
cators’, and synthesise a new generic causal mechanism that seeks to explain how 
‘indicators’ can achieve policy impact, proposing its general applicability across a 
range of policy contexts and ‘indicators’. Impact is understood in terms of policy 
framing and agenda-setting, as these are areas in which ‘indicators’ can have most 
influence (Parks et al. 2015). Shifts in policy framing can be understood as changes 
in the way that policymakers understand and talk about a social problem or the pos-
sible responses to it (Chong and Druckman 2007). The HANCI project frames hun-
ger and undernutrition as issues of political commitment, rather than as a matter 
of inadequate food production, overpopulation, poverty or other frames that could 
be adopted. It posits that credible evidence on political commitment could persuade 
non-policy elite stakeholders, such as civil society groups, and policy elites, such 
as senior government officials, ministers and parliamentarians, to adjust their own 
framings of hunger and undernutrition in such terms (te Lintelo et al. 2014).
We investigate impact in four countries with high burdens of undernutrition in 
which HANCI producers collaborated closely with civil society groups: Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Malawi and Zambia. We also consider any impact at the wider international 
level. The selection of case countries was based on a programmatic research design, 
reflecting funder prioritisation as well as presence of interested local partners. The 
small number of quite different countries in our HANCI study precluded the use of 
conventional experimental designs which, as Yin (2013, p. 323) argues, require the 
availability of a sufficiently large number of cases that can be divided into two (or 
more) comparison groups. Case study evaluations must thus rely on other techniques 
such as process tracing.
PT methodology encourages us to understand any policy impact (Y) as the out-
come of a causal mechanism, composed of individually necessary ‘parts’ com-
posed of ‘entities’ (objects/actors/institutions) that engage in ‘activities’ to jointly 
transmit causal forces. In order to make plausible claims about the validity of the 
causal mechanism, we need to observe for each part (a) whether the mechanism 
is present or absent in the case and (b) whether the mechanism and its parts func-
tioned as expected. However, even if (a) and (b) are confirmed, we cannot yet 
make logical claims about whether the mechanism is sufficient or necessary to 
explain Y (Beach and Pedersen 2013, pp. 15–18). We therefore need to scrutinise 
the inferential strength of the evidence for each posited part of the causal mecha-
nism, as well as for alternative explanations (rival hypotheses). Accordingly, we 
first identify and collect the kinds of evidence that we expect to see if the part 
is valid as well as those kinds that would refute it. Collected evidence is then 
assessed along two dimensions: uniqueness (sufficiency) and certainty (or neces-
sity). As ‘indicators’ typically involve multiple causality, separating out ‘unique-
ness’ and ‘certainty’ is particularly important (Stern et  al. 2013). Uniqueness 
entails empirical predictions that cannot be explained by other theories or causal 
mechanisms. Hence, such evidence has confirmatory power. Uniqueness corre-
sponds to a low likelihood ratio. Certainty, on the other hand, expresses what 
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kind of evidence must be present for the postulated parts of the causal mechanism 
to be correct. Barnet and Munslow (2014) summarise the work of Beach and 
Pedersen (2013) in slightly different terms of theory (≈causal mechanisms) and 
hypotheses (≈component parts), to argue that theory testing requires seeking evi-
dence that would (be minimally needed to) confirm the hypothesis (providing cer-
tainty) and evidence that would refute it, and then identify tests for uniqueness. 
Consequently, one can identify four broad test types (Fig. 2): straw-in-the-wind, 
hoop, smoking-gun and doubly decisive tests. The tests are classified according to 
whether passing the test is necessary and/or sufficient for accepting the inference 
(Collier 2011, p. 825). Straw-in-the-wind tests are not of much value for our pur-
poses, while smoking-gun and doubly decisive tests have low levels of likelihood 
but great affirmative value for the proposed hypotheses, if passed. Hoop tests do 
not confirm a hypothesis, but they can eliminate it. When passed, they help to 
enhance certainty in the relevance of the posited part. But when they fail, they 
declare the part invalid. We use hoop and smoking-gun tests in the analysis.
We draw on a range of evidence types. Documentary sources include annual or 
multi-year work plans, strategic plans, advocacy and media strategies, press releases, 
campaign materials or presentations at high-level policy forums. We further use tes-
timonial evidence obtained through a limited number of key informant interviews 
with government officials, civil society and political leaders.
Finally, we note that, while evaluation methodologies often posit that evaluators 
should be objective and distanced from the subject being evaluated, the authors of 
this study instead fulfilled a ‘developmental evaluator’ role (Patton 2011). Devel-
opmental evaluation allows for capturing emerging features within complex sys-
tems. Having taking this role, we take particular care not to make definitive judg-
ments about success or failure (Coffman 2009, p. 11). Yet, PT advances an unbiased 
assessment of the causal mechanism by specifying anticipated and actual evidence, 
explicating how we interpret the strength of presented evidence and discussing 
where evidence is absent. PT’s inferential logic enables us to make stronger causal-
ity claims than ordinary qualitative case studies (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Collier 
Fig. 2  Four types of process-tracing tests for causal inference Source Bennett (2010, p. 210) and Van 
Evera (1997, pp. 31–32), adapted in Barnet and Munslow (2014, p. 20)
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2011). Nevertheless, full verification of HANCI’s impact through an independent 
evaluation at a later stage may draw out further learning.
Results
The proposed causal mechanism for the policy impact of HANCI contains three 
parts (Fig. 3). We run through these from left to right.
First, we establish the presence of independent variable X: the HANCI ‘indica-
tor’. This is evidenced by a list of published research and communications products 
for 2012–2015 that include: evidence reports and a learning partnership report, an 
updated website www.hanci ndex.org, one animated film, infographics/maps, slide-
shows and journal articles (Food Policy, World Development); and for each new 
issue of HANCI: scorecards with rankings and data for 45 countries and interna-
tional/country-specific press releases, tweets and blogs. While ‘indicators’ often 
“rely on practices of measurement and counting that are [themselves] opaque” 
(Merry 2011, p. S84 ed.), HANCI reports transparently outlined methodological 
choices and their effects on rankings by conducting statistical sensitivity analyses. 
Country scorecards showed data, sources and reference years, while the website ena-
bled visitors to see how personalised weighting choices affected country rankings. 
‘Indicators’ in many areas conceal underlying theories of change (Merry 2011). A 
recent review of 22 ‘indicators’ in the field of nutrition however underlined that 
HANCI is rare in explicitly setting out a theory of change from the start (Results for 
Development 2019).
We next look step by step at the three parts of the proposed causal mechanism.
Theorecal Level Part 1 of causal 
mechanism
Part 2 of causal 
mechanism
Part 3 of causal 
mechanism
Acvity 1
Promote access to and 
use of HANCI through 
communication strategies 
and products, and 
targeted partnership 
activities
Acvity 2
HANCI evidence is used to 
inform policy framing of 
hunger and nutrition as an 
issue of political 
commitment and/or to guide 
programmatic and funding 
decisions
Acvity 3
Shaming/praising,
mobilising, advocacy, 
information provision and 
media tactics to influence 
policy framings of hunger 
and nutrition as an issue of 
political commitment
X
HANCI is
produced
Enty 1
producers
Enty 3
Non-elite policy 
stakeholders
Step 1
Infer existence of causal 
mechanism
Y
Policy elites express 
new understandings 
and framings in 
political and policy 
debates and/or set 
new policy agendas
Step 3
Collect evidence
Empirical, case-
specific level
Observable
manifestaons
Observable
manifestaons
Observable
manifestaons
Observable
manifestaons
Observable
manifestaons
Step 2
Infer existence of manifestaons
'Facts' of the case (e.g. as empirical narrative)
Enty 2
Non-elite policy 
stakeholders
Fig. 3  A causal mechanism for how HANCI affects policy elite framings and agenda-setting Source 
Adapted from Beach and Pedersen (2013)
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Part 1 of the Causal Mechanism
Part 1 of the mechanism references the efforts that are required to enable non-elite 
policy stakeholders’ (notably policy advocacy CSOs) access to ‘indicators’. Davis 
et al. (2012) note that ‘indicator’ use is facilitated by communications strategies and 
products that are relatively simple, free of charge, presented in user-friendly for-
mats, and claim originality and innovation, and for which complementary products 
such as online analytical tools are readily available. In addition, and unlike most 
global ‘indicators’, the HANCI project strongly posited that equitable partnerships 
between producers and users would enhance uptake. Accordingly, three hoop tests 
are proposed:
• Observing a communications strategy
• Finding communications activities and user-friendly products
• Witnessing targeted partnership activities
Absence of evidence for any of these would fatally undermine the validity of Part 
1.
Evidence for Part 1
From its inception in 2013, HANCI findings were disseminated through online 
and in-country launch events, based on a communications strategy that identified 
activities, products and target stakeholders. Press releases were issued at strategic 
moments, for instance, before the British government hosted the G8 and organised 
a Hunger Summit in June 2013. Embargoed press releases encouraged international 
campaigners to circulate findings in their networks. These included the Scaling 
Up Nutrition (SUN) movement, Save the Children’s Everyone campaign, Oxfam’s 
GROW campaign, the IF campaign of a collective of 240 British international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and Generation Nutrition led by Action 
Against Hunger. Findings were further presented at the Second International Confer-
ence on Nutrition in Rome (2014) and the SUN Global Gathering in Milan (2015). 
Research, advocacy capacity building and media-oriented activities were under-
taken with local civil society organisations engaged in nutrition policy advocacy. 
In each country (Bangladesh, Nepal, Malawi and Zambia) the following activities 
were conducted: (a) commissioning in-country research on political commitment, 
(b) capacity-building workshops assessing HANCI evidence for advocacy and (c) 
joint development of priority advocacy messages drawing on HANCI and outreach 
to policy elites. These workshops debated suitable data and sources, on explicit and 
implicit assumptions built into the index (for instance, regarding weighting schemes) 
and methodological limitations (e.g. the logical inability to substitute performance 
on one indicator with another). Except for Malawi, further activities involved (d) 
engagement with local media, including building capacity to report on nutrition.
Table 1 summarises the evidence, showing that all three hoop tests were passed, 
to give confidence that the promotion of HANCI results fostered access and use by 
non-elite stakeholders.
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Part 2 of the Causal Mechanism
Building on Part 1, Part 2 proposes that non-elite policy stakeholders adopt ‘indica-
tors’ to underpin and/or adjust their framings of policy problems and solutions, and/
or to guide programmatic and funding decisions. If Part 2 is valid, we anticipate 
observing that: HANCI registers on the radar of international bodies, agencies and 
thought leaders; INGOs’ campaigns take notice of its evidence; and partner CSOs 
in Zambia, Nepal, Malawi and Bangladesh over time incorporate HANCI findings 
in advocacy materials such as reports, videos, blogs etc. Absence of any such evi-
dence would undermine confidence in this part of the mechanism, as would explicit 
statements that partners are not interested in evidence on political commitment; or 
that partners’ interest in political commitment evidence remains the same before and 
after exposure to HANCI. On the other hand, evidence that relates changes in policy 
framings, programmatic or funding decisions to HANCI could affirm functioning 
of Part 2. Possibly, CSO partners only use HANCI when contracted to do so, hence 
observing their use beyond funded activities would present the passing of a tighter 
hoop test, as would observations that third parties adopt HANCI without being con-
tracted. Furthermore, uniqueness tests could include whether few or no strategic or 
programme documents of CSO partners consider hunger and nutrition in terms of 
political commitment (prior to HANCI engagement), or if no actors—other than 
those involved in HANCI—talk about the need to understand hunger and undernu-
trition in terms of political will.
Evidence for Part 2
Over the course of the period reviewed, representatives of Save the Children, ONE, 
Concern, Oxfam GB, Oxfam India, Oxfam Intermon, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, ActionAid, Trocaire and the global Scaling Up Nutrition movement all 
expressed an interest in using HANCI products, to affirm that HANCI evidence reg-
istered on the radar of leading international agencies. Key findings from the first 
HANCI report were included in a bulletin emailed to all Save the Children staff 
worldwide. Oxfam GB funded the development of a new India-focussed HANCI-
like instrument. The InterAmerican Development Bank offered financial support 
to conduct HANCI primary research in Guatemala, which topped the global rank-
ings, while new funding from the Child Investment Fund Foundation allowed the 
Table 1  Hoop tests for part 1 of the causal mechanism
n.a. not applicable
Hoop test International Bangladesh Malawi Nepal Zambia
HANCI communications strategy Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass
Simple, free, original, user-friendly 
communications products
Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass
Targeted partnership activities n.a. Pass Pass Pass Pass
 D. J. H. te Lintelo et al.
development of a new Africa-focussed HANCI. Panels on HANCI findings were 
presented in the First Global Nutrition Report (IFPRI 2014) and in an article in 
the influential Lancet 2013 Series on Nutrition (Gillespie et al. 2013). HANCI also 
featured in the World Economic and Social Survey on Millennium Development 
Goals lessons for post-2015 (UN DESA 2014). Moreover, HANCI researchers were 
invited to review a methodology for a political commitment tool under development 
by FAO, to join the editorial review group for its flagship State of Food Insecurity 
Report 2014, to participate in the Data Access Group and to support the writing of 
the Global Nutrition Report 2014 and 2015. Finally, HANCI findings featured in 
live-televised (Al Jazeera) and radio interviews (BBC, Radio Moscow and Radio 
Netherlands), in global and national print and web-based newspaper articles (e.g. in 
The Guardian, AllAfrica and Reuters) and by prominent development bloggers.2 To 
conclude, HANCI evidence abundantly registered on the radar of leading interna-
tional development agencies, media and donors.
Evidence for target countries complements the picture. In Zambia, HANCI evi-
dence supported existing advocacy asks of the Zambia CSO-SUN Alliance to build 
political will to tackle undernutrition and to frame undernutrition in terms of politi-
cal commitment (Chilufya and Smit-Mwanamwenge 2014; Zambia CSO-SUN Alli-
ance 2014). “We used HANCI evidence to justify specific calls that the CSO-SUN 
has made for greater political commitment” (pers. comm., W. Chilufya, national 
coordinator 2015). In Malawi, testimonies affirm that non-partner organisations 
used HANCI evidence for policy advocacy (pers. comms., T. Zimpita, coordina-
tor, CSONA, 2015; J. Nyirende, Head of Programmes, Save the Children Malawi, 
2013).
In Bangladesh, the local partner identified food rights a strategic priority and 
campaigned for a Right to Food (RTF) Bill. It envisaged that “the HANSI [sic] data-
base …will be used for our campaign work” (ActionAid Bangladesh 2013, p. 11). 
An RTF campaign brochure elaborated: “Bangladesh ranks 8th in terms of nutrition 
commitment, yet only 27th in terms of hunger commitment” and included images of 
a Bangla-language HANCI scorecard (ActionAid Bangladesh 2014 no page num-
ber). However, several organisational documents did not frame hunger and nutri-
tion in terms of political commitment, notably its Operational Plan, a Position Paper 
on Food Rights and Sustainable Livelihoods and a document called the Design of 
the RTF campaign. Hence, we conclude that, in Bangladesh, HANCI evidence was 
adopted but did not consistently underpin the framing of the RTF campaign in terms 
of political commitment.
‘Indicator’ producers further partnered with Save the Children Nepal and the 
Civil Society Alliance for Nutrition in Nepal (CSANN) to conduct a workshop just 
2 weeks after the latter’s foundation. Immediately afterwards, seven participants co-
drafted CSANN’s Advocacy and Communications Strategy, which made 16 men-
tions of ‘political commitment/will’. It also contained an activity chart showing that, 
in this short time period, no other advocacy-related activities took place that could 
have promoted the framing of hunger and nutrition in terms of political commitment 
2 Details of media reporting can be provided by the authors upon request.
Process Tracing the Policy Impact of ‘Indicators’ 
(CSANN 2014, p. 11). Furthermore, CSANN member organisations adopted and 
used HANCI evidence in their subsequent policy advocacy (pers. comm., U. Koi-
rala, CSANN President 2015).
Accordingly, both internationally and in partner countries, many hoop tests are 
passed (Table 2) and we find substantial evidence underwriting the validity of Part 2 
of the causal mechanism.
Yet, in some instances, these framings pre-dated HANCI engagement. In particu-
lar, CSOs in Malawi, Nepal and Zambia affiliated to the Scaling Up Nutrition move-
ment referenced its global strategy for 2012–2015, which targeted “a major increase 
in political commitment to ending under-nutrition” (SUN 2012, pp. 6, 13). There-
fore, we conclude that HANCI contributed but was not singularly responsible for 
non-elite policy stakeholders’ adoption of political commitment framings.
Part 3 of the Causal Mechanism
Finally, the third part of the causal mechanism considers “non-elite policy stake-
holders employ shaming and praising, mobilising, advocacy, information provision 
and media tactics to influence policy elites’ framing of policy problems and solu-
tions”. Evidence for its validity would include observing that partner as well as non-
partner organisations employ HANCI evidence for such purposes.
Evidence for Part 3
In target countries, partner organisations hosted advocacy events with senior govern-
ment officials. Here, ‘indicator’ producers discussed evidence on political commit-
ment, while CSO partners presented particular policy asks. Carefully timed jointly 
authored press releases advocated for the same, receiving substantial media atten-
tion. In Malawi, a leading newspaper published an article entitled “Government wel-
comes new HANCI findings…” (Face of Malawi 2014). In Bangladesh, six newspa-
pers reported on, and two national TV channels broadcasted interviews based on, the 
advocacy event. In Nepal, the CSANN president was interviewed by a national TV 
station. CSANN further organised a follow-up meeting with ten MPs lobbying for 
stronger engagement on nutrition. Professor Koirala (pers. comm., 2015) recalled:
Using evidence collated by [producers] meant that we were better able to con-
vince policymakers… During our work with [producers] we found it much 
easier to connect evidence to our advocacy asks, which was really important 
for us in terms of establishing credibility as an alliance. It really, really mat-
tered for us.
In Zambia, the CSO-SUN Alliance used HANCI as “a yardstick for advocacy” (pers. 
comm., W. Chilufya, national coordinator, 2015) in workshops with government 
officials and separately with a group of MPs in July–August 2014. The Alliance 
also conducted additional non-contracted activities with MPs to found an All Party 
Parliamentary Caucus on Nutrition in October 2014. Zambia’s low HANCI rank-
ings (17th in 2012, 30th in 2013 and 2014) kick-started discussions with members 
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of three Parliamentary Committees: on Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, on 
Health and on Community and Social Development. Rankings were found “a useful 
tool to provoke government, and to create an appetite to talk about issues of hunger 
and nutrition in the country” (ibid.), including on specific policy recommendations.
Advocacy requires evidence: policymakers ask you who is telling you this? So 
you need to be equipped… It is particularly important also to use, where possi-
ble, data and evidence published by the government itself. So for us one of the 
documents has been HANCI, to support our recommendations (pers. comm., 
W. Chilufya, 2015).
Finally, CSO-SUN platforms in Uganda and Kenya spontaneously employed 
HANCI evidence in advocacy efforts (pers. comms., M. Mumma, KANCO and C. 
Muyama, UCCO-SUN, 2015). KANCO presented HANCI scorecards to the govern-
ment’s Head of Nutrition, the Ministry of Health. Next, KANCO participated in a 
delegation visiting State House, presenting HANCI scorecards and Global Nutrition 
Report data. As a result, the First Lady of Kenya agreed to become patron of the 
national Scaling Up Nutrition campaign. The data were also used to successfully 
persuade Yvonne Chaka Chaka, a famous South African singer, to become a nutri-
tion champion for the organisation (pers. comm., M. Mumma, KANCO, 2015).
Accordingly, media reports, textual and testimonial evidence show that HANCI 
evidence was widely used to underpin CSO advocacy claims towards political elites, 
whether or not they were contracted to do so by the ‘indicator’ producer (Table 3). 
Accordingly, a distinct set of (though not all) hoop tests were passed at the interna-
tional level and within the target countries, to give sufficient confidence that Part 3 
of the causal mechanism functions as proposed.
Did HANCI Achieve Policy Impact (Y)?
As evidence shows that all parts of the proposed causal mechanism are present and 
function, we anticipate observing independent variable Y: “Policy elites express new 
understandings and framings in political and policy debates and/or set new policy 
Table 3  Hoop tests for Part 3 of the causal mechanism
n.a. not applicable
Hoop test International Bangladesh Malawi Nepal Zambia
Partner organisations employ 
HANCI evidence seeking to influ-
ence policy debates and policy 
elites’ thinking
 Contracted n.a. Pass Pass Pass Pass
 Non-contracted n.a. Fail Fail Pass Pass
Non-partner organisations employ 
HANCI evidence seeking to influ-
ence policy debates and policy 
elites’ thinking
Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass
 D. J. H. te Lintelo et al.
agendas”; that is, they portray hunger and nutrition policy problems and solutions 
in terms of political commitment. Such evidence would, at a minimum, need to 
show that monitored governments publicly respond to, contest or seek acclaim based 
on HANCI evidence. Better still, senior political leaders and/or bureaucrats could 
report that such evidence inspired them to bring hunger and nutrition higher up on 
political agendas or to frame these in terms of political commitment, and/or use the 
evidence to define new policy agendas.
Evidence for Y
HANCI impact was uneven across target countries. In Bangladesh, the government 
did not issue a public response to the press release. However, it extended an invita-
tion to the producer and local partner to present findings to the director general (DG) 
of its Food Monitoring and Planning Unit. In this meeting, the DG carefully stud-
ied and then dismissed the HANCI scorecard and the partners’ claim to a Right to 
Food law. Noting that Bangladesh did not get highest scores in terms of ensuring a 
justiciable Right to Food, he argued (pers. comm., N. Farid, 2014) that “I don’t care 
what score Bangladesh is getting…We [our programmes, ed.] are very real. I am not 
interested in some hypothetical issue… I am not aligning our indicators to HANCI 
indicators—no, I am using my own indicators.”
In contrast, in Malawi, the Principal Secretary to the Government for Nutrition, 
HIV and AIDS argued “We believe that the findings by a reputable institution like 
[producer organisation] on the hunger and nutrition [commitment index] will help 
provide insights on how we can improve on our commitments to address the chal-
lenges of hunger and malnutrition” (Face of Malawi 2014). And in Nepal, a member 
of the National Planning Commission noted that HANCI findings are “eye opening 
for government” (pers. comm., M. Shrestha, 2014). Parliamentarians, in consulta-
tions with CSANN, concurred that “Political commitment is of prime importance”, 
with ten signing a pledge to address undernutrition in election manifestos (pers. 
comm., U. Koirala, October 2015).
In Zambia, the Minister of Agriculture was enraged by low HANCI rankings. He 
called a committee investigation, but the committee affirmed the veracity of data 
used (pers. comm., anonymised committee member, 2015). The CSO-SUN Alliance 
meanwhile had discussions with government officials, who argued that their efforts 
to combat undernutrition were inadequately reflected in the index, to demand full 
transparency of data sources used. In response, ‘indicator’ producers commenced 
sharing Zambia data with the Alliance board, who in turn allowed government offi-
cials to have a sneak preview. This allowed CSO–Government relations to remain 
constructive. Rankings also generated much traction in advocacy meetings with 
MPs. The Zambian All Party Parliamentary Caucus on Nutrition official statute 
identified generating strong political will as one of six objectives. One of its mem-
bers, the honourable Hamududu MP, noted (pers. comm., August 2014) “HANCI is 
a very good tool to help us qualify how well we are doing—[we] can worry about 
the specific data that is included, but this provides us with a framework to think 
through how we can be improving our commitment.”
Process Tracing the Policy Impact of ‘Indicators’ 
Also outside the four target countries, policy elites and bilateral and multilateral 
donors were found to liberally use HANCI evidence. Guatemala’s top ranking was 
proudly announced by Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security (Government of 
Guatemala 2013), and noted in various reports (Government of Guatemala 2015, p. 
106) and in a televised news programme. President O.P. Molina, in a speech at the 
Third Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, under-
lined that government initiatives “contributed to Guatemala receiving the highest 
rating in the Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index” (Hoy Venezuela 2015). 
Vice-President Roxana Baldetti presented its HANCI rankings at the Nutrition for 
Growth Summit in London (Dickson 2013) and in the presidential palace in Guate-
mala, drawing on HANCI infographics (Fig. 4).
This highly unique and certain (doubly decisive) evidence shows that, in Guate-
mala, policy elites explicitly express the need to address hunger and undernutrition 
in terms of political commitment using the HANCI.
Further evidence of the use of HANCI by policy elites was a keynote speech by 
Irish President Michael Higgins to ministers, donors and Malawian academy at the 
University of Lilongwe, congratulating the Government of Malawi on its third-rank-
ing performance in the HANCI (Higgins 2014). Furthermore, by June 2015, the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) of the African Union approached 
the index producers to jointly develop a HANCI for Africa. NEPAD envisaged this 
to support its monitoring of member states’ performance on commitments made to 
address hunger and nutrition, set out in the 2014 Malabo Declaration. Finally, in 
November 2014, the World Health Organization of the UN devised a global moni-
toring framework (GMF) to assess the implementation of policies and programmes 
promoting the achievement of targets for maternal, infant and young child nutrition. 
The framework identifies a core set of variables that all UN member countries must 
report on. It also identifies an extended set of 15 variables, from which countries can 
draw to design national nutrition surveillance systems. One of these variables con-
cerns ‘strength of nutrition governance’, with HANCI identified as one of two met-
rics to be used (WHO 2014, p. 35). Not least because the GMF was devised through 
Fig. 4  Guatemalan Vice-President takes ownership of HANCI findings
 D. J. H. te Lintelo et al.
a consultative process with member states and UN agencies, the specific selection of 
HANCI suggests broad support amongst policy elites to frame hunger and nutrition 
in terms of political commitment. In other words, it constitutes another smoking-gun 
test for Y. We do not consider it to be a doubly decisive test as we also know that, 
besides HANCI, significant global advocacy efforts were made by the SUN Move-
ment using this frame.
Table 4 sums up the results of our assessment. Internationally as well as across 
Malawi, Nepal and Zambia, but not in Bangladesh, have policy elites publicly 
responded to HANCI evidence on political commitment by challenging, denying 
or embracing its value? Evidence was strongest for Zambia. While we have not 
witnessed a specific change in the substance of national policies, laws or budgets, 
passed hoop tests suggest that its future occurrence is conceivable. Furthermore, at 
the international level, a doubly decisive test was passed for Guatemala. Both the 
citing of HANCI by the Irish President and in the WHO Global Monitoring Frame-
work selecting HANCI constitute smoking-gun tests. We thus conclude that there is 
strong evidence for outcome Y.
Discussion
In this penultimate section of the paper we reflect on the methodological, empiri-
cal and theoretical implications of our findings. We first debate the process tracing 
methodology and then propose a number of suggestions advancing the theorisation 
of the relationship between ‘indicators’ and policy impact.
Reflections on Process Tracing
Most ‘indicator’ producers aim to affect social change or policy reform. Yet, con-
clusive proof of such impact is often hard to establish (Davis 2014, pp. 46–47). 
This paper provides evidence supporting the theory that ‘indicators’ lead to pol-
icy impact. The impacts of HANCI were noted across countries and at the inter-
national level. However, policy processes are often dynamic and complex systems 
(see e.g. Baumgartner and Jones 2009) within which interventions are unlikely to 
have linear effects. ‘Indicators’ constitute one potential factor, amongst a range of 
other dynamic factors affecting policymakers, such as a salient policy shift unre-
lated to the intervention, the existence of a similar intervention or some other uni-
dentifiable influence in the wider context (Yin 2013). Observing causal connections 
between ‘indicators’ and their effects on policy stakeholders’ beliefs, attitudes and 
decisions is hence difficult, and counterfactuals cannot be established; For instance, 
when policymakers refer to an ‘indicator’, this does not mean that subsequent behav-
iour is affected by it. They may present data to justify a decision after the fact, to 
display a symbolic commitment to evidence-based decision-making or may simply 
resist pressure to change behaviour (Davis et al. 2012). They may also shift behav-
iours in ways designed to improve their score, but in ways not desired by the ‘indica-
tor’ producer (Merry 2011). Policymakers use diverse types and sources of data in 
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decision-making processes, so even when they are influenced by ‘indicators’, they 
are unlikely to rely entirely on them (Davis et al. 2012).
Moreover, even within our limited set, civil society partners have heterogene-
ous existing capacities, expertise and focus, funding, leadership, motivation and 
drive—all affecting their ability to engage in producer–user relationships that seek 
to influence policy. Simultaneously, political contexts differ tremendously between 
countries: Platforms through which governments engage with policy advocates and 
political space for critique are quite uneven, as is governments’ historical interest in 
food security and nutrition issues. Accordingly, rather than singling out determinant 
factors driving policy impact, or parsing out the relative contribution of civil society 
partners, producers or standalone HANCI ‘indicators’, a comparison of within- and 
across-country cases allows for the investigation of the configuration of factors that 
contribute to producing particular policy impacts within context (cf. Byrne 2013; 
Stern et al. 2013).
This is the approach that this paper has followed. Process tracing allowed for a 
careful investigation and triangulation of a catalogue of evidence types using multi-
ple data sources and involving multiple (producer and user) analysts. PT offered an 
explicit procedure for assessing the causal inferential strength of evidence, facilitat-
ing a balanced assessment of the plausibility of hypotheses and rival explanations. 
Yet, conducting qualitative impact evaluations with acceptable and rigorous proce-
dures is still in its formative stages and explicit procedures are needed to deal with 
how and whether the acceptance or rejection of rival explanations meet standards 
as being ‘acceptable’, ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ (Yin 2013). By ensuring that evaluators 
declare assumptions and their weighing of the evidence, PT enables verification 
and triangulation by other researchers and help producers to guard against hubristic 
claims about ‘indicator’ impact. Moreover, process tracing encourages making new 
analytical generalisations. This has been considered the “preferred manner of gener-
alizing from case studies and case study evaluations” (Yin 2013, p. 327). The next 
section hence summarises how our study sought to refine ‘indicator’ theory.
Implications for ‘Indicator’ Theory
In this section we consider in what ways study findings relate to both ‘political’ 
and ‘design’ approaches to ‘indicators’. While there is no singular scientific way of 
producing an ‘indicator’, design and interpretation can be done in valid and invalid 
ways (Masset 2011; Ravallion 2011). We propose that a robust design is a necessary 
but insufficient condition for ‘indicators’ to have potential for enduringly influencing 
policymakers. Policymakers critically review methods underlying ‘indicators’, par-
ticularly when these show them in a poor light. Producers can underwrite ‘indicator’ 
credibility by ensuring construct validity, an explicit theory of change, and transpar-
ency regarding data employed, methodological choices made and their effects on the 
performance of the ‘indicator’.
Current theorisation highlights elite peer shaming, domestic politics and 
international pressure as main causal factors in shaping policy impact (Kelley 
and Simmons 2015), with relations between producers and users portrayed as 
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dichotomous and hierarchical. Our findings however suggest that a reconceptu-
alised relationship between producers and users can not only catalyse the policy 
impact but also redress important concerns about the ways in which ‘indicators’ 
explicitly or implicitly configure such relations.
Equitable partnerships involve open, respectful, equal and trustful relations 
between ‘indicator’ producers and users, to the extent that boundaries between 
their roles may blur. Such partnerships allow for the involvement of people across 
scientific disciplines and policy sectors to overcome silo mentalities that often 
inhibit coordinated action on nutrition. Equitable partnerships can foster transpar-
ency and democratise deep understanding of the technical structure and function-
ing of ‘indicators’, demystify research evidence and break down barriers between 
(typically Northern) academic producers and (Southern) practitioner users, to 
address critiques of ‘indicators’ being technocratic and elite-driven. Moreover, 
users’ in-depth understanding of the substance and functioning of ‘indicators’ 
can foster their effective deployment. For CSO users, particularly as the political 
space for policy advocacy is narrowing globally (Carothers and Brechenmacher 
2014), having a sound understanding of strengths and limitations of ‘indica-
tor’ evidence is critical for effectively engaging potentially hostile governments. 
Moreover, equitable partnerships allow producers to obtain regular user feedback 
to improve ‘indicator’ design and an enhanced understandings of their tactical 
deployment by policy advocates.
While the case study evaluation literature assigns causal power to context (Stern 
et  al. 2013), most ‘indicators’ are tone-deaf about local conditions (Davis 2014). 
They homogenise, simplify and depoliticise complex context-specific phenomena 
(Davis et  al. 2012; Larner and Le Heron 2004; Merry 2011). Although this is a 
reasonable observation, such recognition is neither beyond CSO users nor beyond 
targeted policymakers. Thus, while the value of ‘indicators’ is often portrayed in 
terms of holding leaders accountable to international standards (Kelley and Sim-
mons 2015; Rosga and Satterthwaite 2009), we find that users’ credibility depends 
on connecting ‘indicators’ to domestic standards, as for instance set out in a national 
nutrition policy, and to draw on domestically produced data, especially government 
statistics. We further find that elite shaming is used sparingly as it is politically 
costly. Where used, it is done in combination with praising tactics to avoid burning 
down carefully constructed relationships of engagement that enable effective policy 
advocacy.
Within equitable partnerships, policy advocates employ ‘indicators’ in a tacti-
cal manner to instrumentally open up topics for discussion, although on their own 
terms and at a time of their choosing. In such circumstances, ‘indicators’ do not 
depoliticise but rather repoliticise. The best policy advocates use ‘indicators’ at 
opportune moments, finely attuned to priorities of political leaders and other local 
political economy dynamics. This matters because “senior-level decision-makers 
are selective and strategic… paying more attention to assessments that align with 
pre-existing government interests, policies and programs” (Parks et al. 2015, p. 9). 
Consequently, country-specific diagnostics, intelligently applied, can exert greater 
influence on policy reforms than cross-country benchmarking. In sum, equitable 
producer–user partnerships can better interpret and act on local context to more 
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effectively mobilise domestic politics, elite peer shaming (and praising) and capital-
ise on international pressure.
Based on these reflections on ‘indicator’ design and ‘indicator’ politics, Fig.  5 
shows a synthesis causal mechanism for the impact of ‘indicators’ on policy fram-
ing.3 Although most impact evaluation models fail to consider the causality impart-
ing arrows in their diagrams (Yin 2013, p. 324), arrows in Figs. 5 (and 3) represent 
equitable producer–user partnership activities, with forward/backward directions 
illustrating feedback loops. Such activities can take many forms—for instance, joint 
workshops to examine and unpack the ‘indicator’, cooperatively crafting advocacy 
messages and jointly presenting evidence informed advocacy claims to policy elites 
such as MPs. Needless to say, equitable producer–user partnerships can be a con-
tributory but not determining factor within dynamics driving policy change (cf. Vel-
lema et al. 2013).
We end this section with some reflections on what enables or constrains equitable 
partnerships. Without being exhaustive, enabling factors include producers and users 
having prior trusting relationships rooted in a participatory and egalitarian ethos, a 
mutual recognition of complementary strengths (e.g. superior understanding of local 
context for effective advocacy versus research rigour and academic credibility) and 
a commitment to develop technically robust ‘indicators’ that are made comprehensi-
ble by effective communications and used with integrity. Producers must be willing 
to let users drive decisions on how and when to use ‘indicator’ evidence, consult 
them on the interpretation of emerging evidence and be willing to adjust ‘indicator’ 
Theorecal
Level
Part 1 of causal 
mechanism
Part 2 of causal 
mechanism
Part 3 of causal 
mechanism
Acvity 1
Promote access to 
and use of 
'indicator' through 
(a) strategic 
communication 
and (b) equitable 
partnerships 
Acvity 2
Adopt 'indicator' to 
underpin/adjust
their framing of 
policy problems 
and solutions 
and/or to guide 
programmatic and 
funding decisions
Acvity 3
Employ 'indicator'
in shaming and 
praising, mobilising, 
advocacy, 
information 
provision and/or 
media tactics, to 
influence framing 
of policy problems 
and solutions
X
A technically 
robust 
'indicator' is 
produced 
Enty 1
Producers
Enty 2
Non-elite policy 
stakeholders
Enty 3
Non-elite policy 
stakeholders
Y
Policy elites 
express new 
understan-
dings and
framings in 
political and 
policy 
debates 
and/or set 
new policy 
agendas
Fig. 5  A causal mechanism explaining how ‘indicators’ influence policy elites Source Adapted from 
Beach and Pedersen (2013)
3 Policy or legal reform, better programme financing or improved policy implementation constitute other 
ways in which ‘indicators’ may have policy impact; however, these lie beyond the scope of this paper.
Process Tracing the Policy Impact of ‘Indicators’ 
design based on these consultations. Constraining factors include, for both users and 
producers, adequate time, financial and other resources to effectively build trusting 
relations. For producers, mind-sets may constrain too: It is typically easier to pro-
duce figures from behind a desk than to work with users, even though this advances 
the chances that ‘indicators’ are appropriately used to influence policy.
Conclusions
This article observed the rapid proliferation of global food and nutrition security 
‘indicators’, to note that their impact on policy is routinely assumed, yet rarely dem-
onstrated. Innovatively using a process tracing approach, we established the impact 
of one ‘indicator’, the Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI), on 
national and international policy framing and agenda-setting processes. The analysis 
proposes a causal role for equitable producer–user partnerships in achieving policy 
impact, enriching current theorisation of ‘indicators’ which emphasises the role of 
technically sound design and effective communication. Such partnerships allow for 
a better understanding, attuning to and navigation of local context, typically blind-
sided in ‘indicators’ despite their causal force. As such, ‘indicator’ producers and 
users have much to gain from such partnerships: credibility, access to policymak-
ers, and insight into and greater ability to navigate complex political economies, to 
enable a more effective and politically sensitive employment of ‘indicators’.
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